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New York City's financial crisis' has prompted concern about the
viability of the federal municipal bankruptcy act (Chapter IX).2 Chap-
ter IX was enacted during the Depression to control the rash of de-
faults by small towns and improvement districtsa and was not designed
to accommodate problems of the scale posed by New York and other
major cities. 4 Since the other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act are ex-
pressly inapplicable to municipalities, 5 creditors of large cities" may
1. New York City nearly defaulted on the repayment of its bonded debt in October,
1975. City officials predicted that a default in December was inevitable in the absence
of federal aid. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 4, at 1, col. 1. On December 6, 1975, Congress
approved a S2.3 billion loan to the city. Id., Dec. 7, 1975, at 1, col. 8. For discussions of
the financial crisis, see id., Aug. 30, 1975, § 4, at 1, col. 3; id., Sept. 28, 1975, § 4, at 14,
col. 1; id., Oct. 18, 1975, at 1, col. 8; NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 1975, at 27-28; BusiNEss WEEK,
Sept. 1, 1975, at 51, 53.
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 401-403 (1970). Because of New York's financial problems, "all eyes
turned to Chapter IX. . . . [It] has little utility and cannot be used in circumstances
similar to those faced by New York." King, Municipal Insolvency: Chapter IX, Old
and New; Chapter IX Rules, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 56 (1976).
3. Between 1929 and 1937, 4,771 governmental units defaulted on repayment of their
indebtedness. Of these, there were 417 counties, 1,434 incorporated municipalities, 88
towns and organized townships, 1,241 school districts, 944 reclamation, levee, irrigation,
and drainage districts, 646 other special districts, and one state. G. HEMPEL, THE POST-
WAR QUALITY OF STATE AND LOCAL DEBT 22 (1971). As of March 1, 1934, 95 percent of the
cities and towns in default had populations under 30,000. A. HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL
BONDS: A CENTURY OF EXPERIENCE 22 (1936).
For further statistical information on defaults, both before and after the Bankruptcy
Act, see J. MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 179-85 (1965); A. RABINO-
WITZ, MUNICIPAL BOND FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION (1969); Shanks, The Extent of
Municipal Defaults, 24 NAT'L MUN. REV. 32 (1935).
4. In the hearings on the predecessor to Chapter IX, the Mayor of Detroit argued
that the bill the committee eventually reported was useful only to small cities. Hearings
on H.R. 1670, 3083, 4311, 5267, and 5009 before the House Comin. on the Judiciary, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 84-87 (1933) (statement of Frank Murphy).
For general surveys of the Municipal Bankruptcy Act and its history, see Lehman, The
Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act, 5 J. FINAN. 241 (1960); Patterson, Municipal Debt
Adjustments Under the Bankruptcy Act, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 520 (1942); Note, A Survey of
Municipal Bankruptcy Law and Procedure, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 478 (1971); Note, The
New Federal Municipal Debt Re-Adjustment Act, 24 VA. L. REv. 181 (1937). The statute
is also discussed in 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY j81.01-81.27 (14th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited
as COLLIER]; 2 MODERN BANKRUPTCY MANUAL: LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1411-1441 (1966); 10
H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW §§ 4284-4344 (rev. ed. 1947).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1970).
6. The revision of Chapter IX recently proposed by President Ford applied only to
cities with populations of one million or more. Wall St. J., Oct. 30, 1975, at 27, col. 4.
This Note rejects a definition of "large city" based only on population. Instead, it will
define a large city simply as one where the size and structure of the debt prevent the
use of existing federal bankruptcy procedures. See note 61 infra.
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be left to the uncertain state remedies that CongTess intended to
bypass.7
Perhaps the most flawed provision of Chapter IX is the requirement
that a plan of municipal debt readjustment be approved by a vote of
the creditors. The revisions of- Chapter IX recently proposed by the
Senate and House of Representativess do not remedy the inadequacy.
This Note proposes an alternative procedure for creditor participa-
tion in municipal bankruptcy.9
7. When Chapter IX was enacted, it was assumed that the contracts clause of the
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1, precluded any scaling down or extension of
municipal debts by the states. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No.
One, 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936). See Hearings on H.R. 2505, 2506, 5403, and 5969 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Bankruptcy and Reorganization of the House Judiciary Comm..
75th Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 3, at 123 (1937) (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox). In Faitoute
Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942), however, the Court held that
a state could enact laws providing for compositions of indebtedness. Congress responded
with an amendment to the municipal bankruptcy act specifying that no state law estab-
lishing a method of composition could be made binding on nonconsenting creditors. Act
of July 1, 1946, ch. 532, § 83, 60 Stat. 409 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 403(i) (1970)). Since it
is generally not permissible to execute on the property of a municipality except as pro-
vided by statute, 30 Ams. JUR. 2D Executions §§ 195-99 (1967), the only available state
remedy is mandamus to compel levy of taxes. Yet the ineffectiveness of this remedy had
prompted passage of Chapter IX in the first place. Hearings on H.R. 1670, 3083, 4311,
5267, and 5009, supra note 4, at 24-25 (1933) (statement of Rep. J. Mark Wilcox). For
discussion of the shortcomings of state remedies, see Dimock, Legal Problems of Finan-
cially Embarrassed Municipalities, 22 VA. I. REV. 39 (1935); Fordham, Methods of En-
forcing Satisfaction of Obligations of Public Corporations, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 28 (1933);
Frye, Municipal Insolvency: Its Special Problems from the Point of View of the General
Practitioner, 2 LEGAL NOTES ON LOCAL GOV'T 195 (1937).
However, a state may not be powerless to extend municipal debts. A moratorium on
New York City's bonded debt has been enacted by the New York State legislature and
upheld as constitutional by the state supreme court. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal
Assistance Corp., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 24, 1975, at 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term, Dec. 23, 1975).
8. In December, 1975, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 10624, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 10624], a revision of Chapter IX. The Senate
adopted a similar measure, S. 2597, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as S.
2597]. The differences between the two bills were reconciled by a conference committee
on February 20, 1976. Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1976, at 4, col. 3.
The House and Senate bills represent a synthesis of a number of prior proposals. The
recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States are
embodied in Chapter VIII of H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (the Senate counterpart
is S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)). Those of the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges are embodied in Chapter IX of H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (the Senate
counterpart is S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)). On October 29, 1975, President Ford
proposed a similar revision, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1975, at 48, col. I; Wall St. J., Oct. 30,
1975, at 3, col. 1. On September 30, 1975, Congressman Herman Badillo introduced H.R.
9926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), proposing abolition of the creditor approval provisions
of Chapter IX. The rules proposed by the Judicial Conference would accomplish within
the present statutory structure some of the reforms in these bills. COMMNI. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOsED
RuLus UNDER CHAPTER IX OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT (July 1974).
This Note will focus on the revisions adopted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
9. Other troublesome aspects of Chapter IX addressed by the House and Senate
revisions but not discussed in this Note include the treatment of executory contracts, see
H.R. 10624, §§ 82(b), 88(c); S. 2597, §§ 801(b)(1), 810(b), the arrangement of priorities, see
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I. The Creditor Approval Provisions
Chapter IX provides for composition of indebtedness'0 by a city or
other local governmental agency" which is insolvent or unable to meet
its debts as they mature.12 The city may invoke the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court by filing a petition alleging insolvency." A plan of
composition approved in writing by or on behalf of creditors holding
at least 51 percent by value of the securities14 affected by the plan must
accompany the petition.15 The plan then becomes the subject of hear-
ings at which all creditors may present objections and suggest alterna-
tives."3, The court may approve modifications in the plan, subject to
H.R. 10624, § 89; S. 2597, § 812, and the issuance of certificates of indebtedness, see H.R.
10624, § 82(b)(2); S. 2597, § 811. For a brief discussion of these provisions, see King,
supra note 2, at 61-64.
10. A composition is an agreement between an insolvent debtor and its creditors to
scale down the former's obligations. Under the federal bankruptcy power, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4, an agreement accepted by a statutorily prescribed majority of creditors
may be imposed by the court on the minority. See Cumberland Glass Co. v. DeWitt, 237
U.S. 447, 452 (1915).
Before enactment of Chapter IX, only voluntary compositions of municipal debts were
possible, requiring unanimous creditor approval of the plan of repayment. This require-
ment allowed a small minority of creditors to frustrate any rearrangement of debts and
encouraged pressure tactics by the majority. Some of the problems that arose are cata-
logued in Dession, Municipal Debt Adjustment and the Supreme Court, 46 YALE L.J.
199 (1936). One purpose of Chapter IX is to bind all creditors to a plan approved by two-
thirds of them and found equitable by the court. See In re Drainage Dist. No. 7, 25 F.
Supp. 372, 377 (E.D. Ark.), af 'd, 104 F.2d 696 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Haverstick
v. Drainage Dist. No. 7, 308 U.S. 604 (1939).
11. Governmental units that may petition under Chapter IX include various irriga-
tion, reclamation, and local improvement districts, as well as municipalities and counties.
11 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). This Note will consider only the application of the statute to
municipalities. For a discussion of its application to the other governmental units, see
Note, A Survey of Municipal Bankruptcy Law and Procedure, supra note 4.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970). For a discussion of standards for determining whether
a city is insolvent, see 5 COLLIER, supra note 4, f 81.05, at 1565-66 n.2.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970). The city's participation is entirely voluntary. It must
file the initial petition and approve the final plan. Moreover, the statute disavows any
attempt to impair the control of the state over municipalities, including control over
expenditures. Id. § 403(i).
14. In addition to bonds and notes, "securities" could include claims for wage, pension,
and welfare payments. See pp. 428-29 & note 37 infra.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970). The rules for Chapter IX proposed by the Judicial
Conference would eliminate the 51 percent requirement. CONsM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, supra note 8, Rule 9-24 (1974). The authority conferred on the Judicial
Conference, however, is to propose procedural changes to the Supreme Court for its con-
sideration and adoption, modification, or rejection, "in accordance with law." 28 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1970). It would seem that the proposed procedural changes have encroached on
the substance of the statute in violation of the Conference's mandate.
Along with the petition, the city must file a list of all known creditors. 11 U.S.C.§ 403(a) (1970). The proposed rules interpret this provision as requiring a list of claims,
including bearer bonds whose holders are unknown. COMM. ON RULES OF PRA IcE AND
PROCEDURE, supra Rule 9-7.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 403(b) (1970). Although the statute does not explicitly give the creditor
a right to present objections in person as well as in writing, the requirement that notice
of the time and place of hearings be sent to all creditors, id. § 403(b), indicates that op-
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the right of creditors adversely affected by the changes to withdraw
their initial approval.17
To be confirmed by the court, the final plan must be accepted in
writing by or on behalf of creditors holding two-thirds of all claims
allowed.' 8 The judge also must find that the arrangement is "fair,
equitable, and for the best interests of creditors and does not discrim-
inate unfairly in favor of any creditors or class of creditors."' 9 Under
certain limited circumstances, the court may disregard an unfavorable
vote and impose a plan that the creditors have rejected.-",
The proposed revisions of Chapter IX eliminate the requirement
that an approved plan accompany the petition.2' Both bills also reduce
the requirement for final confirmation to acceptance by creditors
portunity for personal appearance is contemplated.
Creditors may be represented by a protective committee in all phases of Chapter IX
proceedings. Such a committee must file with the court a list of names and addresses of
all the creditors whom it represents, as well as a complete description of their securities
and a signed contract with each authorizing the committee to operate as his agent. Id.
§ 403(a).
17. Id. § 403(e).
18. Id. § 403(d). In Mason v. Paradise Irrigation Dist., 326 U.S. 536, 54-1 (1946), the
Court construed this provision to require acceptance by "two-thirds of the total amount
of all claims of all classes." There has been some confusion about how to calculate the
total debt of the municipality. Some courts apparently have included all the debt,
regardless of whether creditors have filed claims, in determining whether the requisite
percentage of approval has been reached. See Clark, Procedures Under Act for Composi-
tion of Indebtedness of Local Taxing Agencies, 20 ORE. L. REv. 316, 320 (1941). But sce
Equitable Reserve Ass'n v. Dardanelle School Dist., 138 F.2d 236, 237-39 (8th Cir. 1943).
In that case, the district court, in determining what percentage of creditors had ap-
proved the plan, included creditors who had not filed claims. The Eighth Circuit ap-
pears not to have included them nor to have realized that its method of calculation
differed from that of the district court. Rule 9-22 of the proposed rules for Chapter IX,
CoMMat. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 8, would resolve this confusion
by allowing all claims on the city's list not designated as disputed, contingent, or
unliquidated.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 403(e) (1970).
20. This prerogative is referred to as the "cramdown power." The statute provides
that the court need not secure the assent of any creditor or class of creditors if the plan
does not materially affect them, if it provides for payment of their claims in cash or in
full, or if it ensures "the protection of the interests, claims, or lien of such creditors or
class of creditors." Id. § 403(d). The proposed revisions retain this provision. H.R. 10624,
§ 92(d); S. 2597, § 814(a). The cramdown power in Chapter IX has never been exercised,
10 H. REMINGTON, supra note 4, § 4327, at 570, and therefore it is difficult to ascertain
whether the provision in the current and proposed statutes presents the court with a
viable alternative to elimination of the creditor vote. The adequacy of the protection
required for exercise of the power is determined by reference to the value of the creditors'
claims, which depends on future tax revenues. See Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist.,
319 U.S. 415, 420 (1943). The greater the range of forecasts of future revenues, the
greater the court's discretion under the cramdown provisions. However, the cramdown
provisions allow the court to circumvent or override a creditor vote without requiring that
all creditor interests be represented in the formulation and confirmation of the plan. Cf.
pp. 433-34 infra.
21. H.R. 10624, § 90(a); S. 2597, § 813(b). See H. REP. No. 94-686, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
6-7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HousE REaoRTi; S. RmP No. 94-458, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
14 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
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holding two-thirds in amount of the claims in each class that are
voted.*2 The Senate revision adds the requirement that 51 percent of
the creditors voting in each class accept the plan. 23 If any one class of
creditors rejects the final plan, the court must find that the plan
adequately protects the creditors' interests and use its cramdown
power,2 4 or the petitioner must modify the plan to make it acceptable
to the court or the creditors.2 If such a modification adversely affects
the interests of any creditors, they may withdraw their acceptance. 2 6
As in the current statute, the court has the option of rejecting a plan
that does not meet the statutory standards.2 7
II. Problems with the Creditor Approval Provisions
A. Objections to the Existing Chapter IX Provisions
Chapter IX proceedings are designed to give the force of law to a
voluntary agreement worked out between the city and its creditors.
For many cities, however, this design is likely to prove unworkable.
Both the initial 51 percent and the subsequent 66-2/3 percent creditor
approval provisions are formidable barriers to using federal bankruptcy
procedures. 28
The size and structure of the municipal securities market make it
extremely difficult to obtain the approval of municipal bond- and
noteholders.2 0 Unlike corporate debentures, many municipal bonds
22. H.R. 10624, §§ 92(b), (c); S. 2597, § 814(a).
23. S. 2597, § 814(a). The conference version of the bill retains the requirement of
approval by a numerical majority of creditors. Telephone interview with Richard Levin,
Ass't Counsel, House Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Feb. 24, 1976.
24. H.R. 10624, § 92(d); S. 2597, § 814(a).
25. H.R. 10624, § 90(b); S. 2597, § 815.
26. H.R. 10624, § 92(e); S. 2597, § 815.
27. Both the House and Senate bills change slightly the language of the existing law.
The Senate re ision requires that the plan be found "fair, equitable, feasible, and not
unfairly discriminatory in favor of any creditor or class of creditors." S. 2597, § 817(e)(1).
Compare p. 426 supra. The House bill uses similar language. H.R. 10624, § 94(b)(1).
The Senate revision also requires that it appear from current and projected revenues
and expenditures that the city's budget will be in balance within a reasonable time
after adoption of the plan. S. 2597, § 817(c)(7).
28. The creditor approval provisions were less of a problem for small cities in De-
pression-era Chapter IX proceedings. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation often
would buy a large portion of the outstanding bonds directly from the holders at the
proposed composition rate and vote the bonds in favor of the plan. HoUsE REPORT, supra
note 21, at 7.
29. King, supra note 2, at 56. As of June 30, 1974, New York City had bonded
debt of over 511 billion, 2 MOODY'S MUNICIPAL & GOV'T MANUAL 2527 (1975), and
Los Angeles had bonded debt of S1.8 billion, I id. at 416. As of December 31, 1973,
Chicago's debt was 50.9 billion, 1 id. at 1023, and Houston's was $0.6 billion, 2 id. at
3365; as of June 30, 1973, Detroit's was .0.7 billion, I id. at 1710.
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and notes are unregistered, made out simply to "bearer."!," Further-
more, while commercial banks and institutions hold large numbers
of these obligations, individuals also hold a substantial proportionY1
Simply contacting the necessary percentage of these creditors would
thus appear impossible.3 2
Moreover, bond- and noteholders are not the only creditors of the
city whose consent is required. Under Chapter IX, a "creditor" is one
who holds securities, defined broadly as "bonds, notes, judgments,
claims, and demands, liquidated or unliquidated, and other evidences
of indebtedness, secured or unsecured, and certificates of benefical
interest in property. '' 3 This definition should be liberally construed
in order to facilitate settlement of all the city's obligations and to
subject all settlements to the scrutiny of the court. 34 The history of
the statute indicates that salary and wage claimants qualify as credi-
tors.3 5 In addition, welfare recipients would have a claim against the
30. King, supra note 2, at 56; SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, FUNDAMENTALS OF MU-
NICIPAL BONDS 6 (9th ed. 1973). For a further description of the municipal bond market,
see E. DAvis, ".... OF THE PEOPLE BY THE PEOPLE FOR THE PEOPLE . . ." (rev. ed. 1958);
A. RABINOWITZ, supra note 3.
31. At the end of 1973, commercial and mutual savings banks held 50.8 percent of the
obligations of state and local governments, and households held 26.5 percent. The
balance of the debt was held by insurance companies, state and local governments, and
business corporations. See BOARD OF GovERNORs OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FLOW
OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS 1965-1973, at 42 (Supp. 1974).
It has been estimated that 160,000 individuals or families currently hold $4.89 billion
in New York City bonds, about two-thirds of the $7.35 billion in outstanding bonds. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 19, 1975, at 48, col. 2. Senator William Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate
Banking Committee, put the figure at 180,000 in suggesting the impossibility of obtaining
a "uniform response" from such a large number of creditors. Id., Oct. 26, 1975, at 56, col. 5.
32. In the recent financial crisis, New York City officials claimed they could not
identify a sufficient number of creditors to meet the statutory requirement for 51 percent
approval. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1975, at 48, col. 1; id., Oct. 5, 1975, at 51, col. 2; id., Aug.
30, 1975, § 4, at 1, col. 3.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 402 (1970). See, e.g., Poinsett Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Drainage Dist. No.
7, 119 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1941) (landowner's unadjudicated claim for damages caused by
water overflow in construction of a floodway by the district made him a creditor within
the meaning of the municipal bankruptcy statute).
34. In a case under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970), the
Seventh Circuit stated that the holder of "any character of claim against the debtor or
its property" should be treated as a creditor and that "a broad construction should be
given to the statute with respect to claims and creditors in order to dispose of all liabilities
of the debtor in reorganization ...... fIn re Plankinton Bldg. Co., 135 F.2d 273, 275
(7th Cir. 1943) (allowing bondholders who had not exchanged their securities for those
of the successor corporation in a previous reorganization to be treated as creditors of
the successor corporation). See 6 COLLIER, supra note 4, ff 2.05 (broad interpretations of
Chapter X definition of creditor). The term "creditor" should also be broadly construed
under Chapter IX.
35. See Note, The New Federal Municipal Debt Re-Adjustment Act, supra note 4, at
186. The first municipal bankruptcy statute specifically excluded salary and wage claim-
ants. Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 345, § 80, 48 Stat. 798, 799. The existing law does not contain
that exclusion.
Claims for back pay clearly would fit under the statutory definition. Breach of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement or other employment contract would give rise to a claim for
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city if it failed to fulfill its statutory obligation to pay benefits.36 Trade
creditors and beneficiaries under municipal pension funds would also
fall within the statutory definition.
If a city's plan of reorganization affected these creditors,37 their
approval would be necessary. While there would be no problem in
identifying them, it is questionable whether a percentage sufficient
to fulfill the statutory requirement would vote.3s And, as is the case
with bond- and noteholders, a large number of individuals would be
involved. 39
Assuming a sufficient percentage of creditors could be contacted and
encouraged to vote, logistical problems in conducting the vote itself
would delay and complicate the readjustment proceeding. The creditor
protective committees which made earlier proceedings manageable 40
are likely to be ineffective or nonexistent for many classes of creditors.41
damages. Under certain circumstances, city employees who were laid off might have a
claim for the deprivation of their "property interest" in continued employment. See
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
36. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SaRv. LAW §§ 158, 349 (eligibility); §§ 61, 62, 153, 348 (city
responsibility) (McKinney Supp. 1974). The welfare recipient's statutory entitlement to
benefits might also be considered a property right which the recipient could claim had
been violated by a failure to pay benefits. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8
(1970).
37. Judge Simon Rifkind, testifying before the Senate Banking Committee, predicted
that "without question" New York would be unable to pay employees in the event of
default. N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1975, at 39, col. 1. Nor would there likely be enough
funds to pay welfare recipients. Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1975, at 34, col. 5. Further, in New
York, a reduction of pension burdens would be a necesary part of any readjustment of
debts. N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1975, at 56, col. 3. It would seem therefore that at least in
New York, these classes of creditors would have to be included in any plan.
38. The likelihood that a given individual will vote depends in part on his perceived
ability to influence the outcome of the election. Cf. A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIc THEORY OF
DEMiocRAcY 36-50 (1957). In the face of large concentrations of debt in commercial in-
stitutions and unions, many individual creditors might consider their influence too
slight to warrant voting.
39. Salary and wage claimants represent a substantial number of potential creditors.
As of February, 1972, New York City had 439,396 employees. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK, 1972, at 564 (1973). Los Angeles had 220,882 employees;
Chicago, 190,562; and Detroit, 120,928. Id. at 554-55.
Welfare recipients also would constitute a large class of potential claimants. In New
York City, 1,126,231 individuals received either Aid to Families with Dependent Children
or Old Age Assistance in 1972, id. at 572; in Los Angeles, 757,204, id. at 562; in Chicago,
537,713, id. at 552; and in Detroit, 299,115, id.
40. The committee can act in all capacities authorized by the creditor. It may receive
notice on behalf of the individual creditor and cast the votes of its constituents as a
block. See 5 COLLIER, supra note 4, j 81.09; 11 U.S.C. § 403(d) (1970) (acceptance of plan
by or on behalf of creditors).
41. The requirement that the committee have written authorization from each creditor
it purports to represent will lead to the same types of logistical difficulties that voting
requirements raise. See pp. 427-28 supra. Yet this requirement cannot be relaxed if the
committee system is to be used. Abolition of the written authorization requirement is
fundamentally different from abolition of the creditor vote, proposed in Part III inIra.
The latter would increase the power of the court; the former would increase the power
and decrease the accountability of private individuals.
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In the absence of committees, creditors must receive individual notice
before each vote and be given a reasonable period to respond. Since
many of these creditors may be unable to evaluate the plan without
professional advice, the court probably would have to allot substantial
time for a response.4 2 When the creditors do respond, the court will
face the time-consuming task of classifying claims4 3 and tabulating
votes.44 After all of these efforts, the court could reject the entire plan
as inequitable, necessitating dismissal of the proceedings. 4
B. Objections to the House and Senate
Revisions of Chapter IX
In order to facilitate access to the bankruptcy court and bring
negotiation of a plan under the court's jurisdiction, the House and
Senate revisions of Chapter IX abolish the initial creditor consent
requirement. 46 However, the proposed statutes do not indicate how
the court should exercise this jurisdiction to ensure a fair plan.47 This
failure to provide supervision is troublesome in the case of large cities.
When small towns and taxing districts sought relief under the
Bankruptcy Act, local officials could meet informally with representa-
tives of substantially all the creditors and work out a plan.48 The
number of creditors of a large city, their widely divergent interests,
and the incomplete network of creditor committees preclude such
informality. The practical limitations of the ad hoc bargaining process
might engender difficult questions as to whom the court should in-
clude in the negotiations. A desire for fairness would dictate representa-
42. The HOUSE RPoRT, supra note 21, at 29, observes:
The court should consider such factors as the time it will take to transmit the plan
to all who are entitled to receive a copy, and the time within which it is reasonable
to expect that a creditor can examine the plan and make an informed decision.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 403(b) (1970). The judge must classify creditors according to the funds
from which repayment is made, according to priority in repayment, and according to the
nature of their claims and interests. 5 COLLIER, supra note 4, f 81.15.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 403(d) (1970).
45. Id. § 403(e).
46. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 6; H.R. 10624, § 90(a); S. 2597, § 813(a); cf.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (pt. I), 93d
Cong., Ist Sess. 274 (1973) (arguing that the 51 percent requirement should be eliminated
because it pressures the judge to confirm the plan by presenting him with a fait
accompli).
47. Indeed, the HOUSE REPORT, supra note 21, at 10, observes: "Because of the flexi-
bility of the process under the Bankruptcy Act, there is no limit to the nature of negotia-
tion that the petitioner may undertake .... "
The first municipal bankruptcy act was also criticized for limiting the court's jurisdic-
tion over negotiations. Douglas, The Legal Problem of Control Over Protective
Committees for Municipal and Quasi-Municipal Obligations, 2 LEGAL NOTES ON LOCAL
GOV'T 81, 85 (1936).
48. Cf. C. CHATTERS & A. HILLHOUSE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEBT ADMINISTRATION 307,
341-42 (1939).
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tion of all interests in the formulation of the plan, but every creditor
conceivably could claim a distinct interest requiring that he be
included.
To circumvent the problem of locating and organizing creditors
for the final vote, the proposed revisions reduce the requisite approval
to two-thirds of those voting in each class. 49 The Senate provision
requires in addition a numerical majority of creditors voting in each
class.51" These modifications leave many problems unresolved. The
revisions do not avoid the logistical difficulties in providing notice to
and conducting a vote of perhaps millions of creditors. Indeed, the
provision for a class-by-class vote increases the chances that the initial
plan will not be accepted. If either the creditors or the court reject
the plan, the logistical problems of the creditor approval process would
have to be confronted anew.
As a matter of statutory policy,5' the expense and delay of requiring
approval by a percentage of claims voted could be justified if out-
weighed by an increased likelihood of obtaining a plan fair to all the
creditors. 5 But such a requirement would decrease, rather than in-
crease, the chances for a fair plan. Many creditors will not vote, and
the nonvoters will not be distributed randomly among all types and
classes of creditors. Almost all institutional investors and creditor
protective committees presumably will vote; many individual investors,
welfare recipients, and nonunionized employees presumably will not.5 3
Hence the revisions may place approval of a plan of readjustment
in the hands of "banks, brokerage houses, and other large creditors." 54
If the court does not classify creditors according to amount of holdings
or degree of organization,5 , the requirement that every class approve
49. H.R. 10624, § 92(b), (c); S. 2597, § 814(a).
50. S. 2597, § 814(a).
51. For the argument that the creditor vote is not constitutionally required, see
pp. 435-38 infra. 41
52. Cf. R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 333 (1973).
53. Under the existing requirement of approval by a percentage of all claims against
the debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 403(d) (1970), a failure to vote is in effect a vote against the
plan. Substituting a requirement of approval by a percentage of claims voted would give
those opposed to the plan an incentive to vote, but would decrease the incentive to vote
of those in favor of the plan. The substitution would also decrease the voting incentive
of small, unorganized creditors, whether for or against the plan. Given the difficulties of
locating these creditors, a lower percentage of their claims will be voted than claims
of institutional and organized creditors. The proposal for approval by percentage of
claims voted therefore increases the influence of the latter group of creditors. The small
creditor perceiving this imbalance may think his vote even less important.
54. Statment by Rep. Herman Badillo, Sept. 30, 1975, at I (press release) (on file with
Yale Law Journa).
55. While the House bill provides more flexible classification standards than the
existing law, the standards relate to the characteristics of the claims rather than to the
characteristics of the creditors. HoUsE REPORT, supra note 21, at 11. The HousE RPORr,
supra at 27, cited In re Hudson-Ross, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 111, 112 (N.D. Ill. 1959), in which
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 85: 423, 1976
the plan (subject to the judge's cramdown power)G would not'
eliminate the danger of domination by larger and better organized
creditors. A judge relying on the creditor vote as conclusive proof of
the fairness of the plan-as some judges apparently have done under
Chapter IXT-may confirm a plan that is in fact unfair to the interests
of smaller or less organized creditors.
The Senate requirement of approval by numerical majority may
mitigate these difficulties, but does not resolve them. Although the
provision was added to "balance the power" of large creditors,5s it
cannot fully counteract the effect of their higher turnout rate.59 More
importantly, it gives an advantage to creditors who can organize over
those who cannot (e.g., union over nonunion labor).
Even if most creditors voted, the creditor approval provisions bor-
rowed from the reorganization sections60 still would not fulfill their
function. The reorganization chapters assume that creditors have suf-
ficient financial sophistication to protect their business interests and
that a substantial percentage of those creditors will organize protec-
tive committees with access to more specialized financial expertise.
In a municipal debt readjustment, these assumptions are questionable.
Municipal creditors include many groups who may be unable to
evaluate the plan without assistance. Yet the creditors most in need
of financial advice may be those least able to organize protective
committees.6' The purpose of a vote is to allow the creditor the
the district court held that 10 principal creditors who had agreed to extension of the
debtor's obligations could not properly be treated as a separate class. Moreoer, the
House bill made the exception that unsecured creditors holding claims of less than $100
may be a separate class, H.R. 10624, § 88(b), suggesting that the judge would not other-
wise have the power to classify creditors on the basis of amount of claims held.
56. H.R. 10624, § 92(d); S. 2597, § 814(a).
57. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 136
F.2d 539, 550 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 787 (1944); In re Drainage Dist. No.
2, 28 F. Supp. 84, 85 (D. Idaho 1939). See also Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganiza-
tion, 44 YALEfL.J. 923, 939 (1935). But see American Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City of AAon
Park, 311 U.S. 138, 148 (1940).
58. SENATE REPORT, supra note 21, at 21.
59. To the extent the Senate provision alleviates the -perceived disparity of influence
between large and small creditors, it may increase the incentive of the latter to vote. See
notes 38, 53 supra.
60. I1 U.S.C. §§ 205(e), 579 (1970). See H.R. REP. No. 207, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933)
(House Report on predecessor to Chapter IX). The revisions appear largely to incorporate
the creditor approval provisions recommended by the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States, which specifically correlates the creditor approval provisions
for municipal bankruptcy with those for corporate reorganization. REPORT OF THE Cost-
MISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAws OF THE UNITED STATES (pt. 11), supra note 46, at 268.
61. Moreover, municipal bondholders may not have the same access to expertise
through protective committees as do corporate bondholders. The requirement that pro-
tective committees have written authorization from every creditor they purport to
represent would make it difficult to form committees to represent holders of bearer
bonds.
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opportunity to express his opinion on whether the plan adequately
protects his interests. If he has no idea how the plan affects his claim,
his vote is meaningless.
III. An Alternative Procedure for Creditor Participation
These shortcomings dictate elimination of the creditor approval
provisions and design of alternative provisions for creditor participa-
tion. This Note proposes an alternative which entails a two-stage debt
readjustment scheme. The city would initiate the first stage by filing
a petition alleging insolvency6" and requesting that the court institute
the creditor participation procedures outlined below. Should the court
find that the existing or revised creditor approval provisions hinder
the orderly readjustment of debts,6 3 it would grant the city's request,
order notice of the proceedings to formulate a plan, and appoint a
panel of trustees to hear the creditors. 64 The number of trustees and
the size of their staff should be sufficient to develop a plan within
the time designated by the court.65
At the inception of the hearings, the panel of trustees would decide
whether the various creditor protective committees should be recog-
nized 6 and whether they may appear at the subsequent confirmation
hearing before the court. The panel would also choose representatives
to appear at the confirmation hearing on behalf of classes of creditors
without protective committees.6 7 Any creditor could come before the
panel to present views on an acceptable plan of debt readjustment and
to challenge the adequacy of his representative. 8 After the hearings,
62. As under the House and Senate revisions, the filing of the petition would operate
as a stay of creditor suits. H.R. 10624, § 85(e); S. 2597, § 805.
63. The creditor approval provisions may be kept in the circumstances where they
were intended to apply: where substantially all of the creditors of the city or their
representatives can vote on a plan without unreasonable cost or delay. This question
would be within the discretion of the court, guided by such criteria as the size of the
city, the amount of the debt, and the types of creditors.
64. Like Chapter X trustees, the panel would formulate the plan of reorganization,
see 11 U.S.C. § 569 (1970), and would have to be "disinterested," see id. §§ 556, 558. But
unlike their Chapter X counterparts, they would not assume control of the debtor. See id.
§ 589.
65. Each trustee could hear a different class or type of creditor and allow each
creditor to present views orally or to file a written statement. With the creditors thus
allocated among a number of trustees, the proceedings should take less time than under
the existing procedures. See NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 1975, at 27; Statement of Rep. Badillo,
supra note 54, at I (estimating two to three years for New York to meet the initial
creditor consent requirement).
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970) (requirements for protective committees under
Chapter IX).
67. The representatives could participate in the proceedings before the panel if the
trustees found themselves unable to discern the interests of the class after hearing those
individual creditors who chose to speak.
68. Existing Chapter IX, the House and Senate revisions, and the other reorganization
statutes allow all creditors to be heard at confirmation hearings. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
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the panel would negotiate for the creditors with appropriate city
officials to formulate a plan. 9 The city would participate as an equal
partner in the bargaining process; neither the panel nor the judge
could impose a plan on the city, dictate its fiscal policy, or assume
control of its operations."0
The second stage of the proceedings would be the confirmation
hearings on the plan. At the hearings, the court first would review the
panel's choice of representatives and appoint others for those interests
which remained inadequately represented. Only creditor representa-
tives approved by the court would have standing at the confirmation
hearings. With the consent of the city, the court could either modify
the plan to meet statutory criteria or remand to the panel if major
changes were required. The court would only confirm a plan meeting
statutory standards. 71
IV. Advantages of the Proposed Procedures
Elimination of the creditor approval provisions and adoption of the
above proposal would solve many of the deficiencies of the existing
statute and the proposed revisions. The proposal allows the court to
bypass the difficulties in securing the consent of a prescribed percent-
age of creditors. It also insulates the confirmation hearings from a
barrage of objections from individual creditors.7 2
§ 403(b) (1970) (Chapter IX); id. § 606 (Chapter X). The judicial hearing under the pro-
cedures proposed in this Note is granted only to creditor representatives. However, the
creditor would be allowed to appear at the confirmation hearing if he could show that
his representative was inadequate under the standard of FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), providing
for intervention as of right. A representative is inadequate if he has acted in bad faith,
if he possesses or represents an interest adverse to the creditor's, or if he is guilty of
nonfeasance in his duty of representation. See 3B MOORE'S FEDMF.RL PRAcTicE 24.08(2),
at 24.18-85 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as MooRE]. The creditor's right of intervention
may be "subject to appropriate conditions or restrictions responsive among other things
to the requirements of efficient conduct of the proceedings." Notes of Advisory Com-
mittee on 1966 Amendment to Rules, 28 U.S.C. app. at 7771 (1970).
69. To ensure good faith performance of the trustees' duties to the creditors, a record
of the negotiations should be made for review by the court.
70. Even if these restrictions are not required by the Tenth Amendment, see note 81
inIra, they are justified by limitations on judicial competence. The judiciary is not
equipped to perform the administrative and legislative functions involed in running a
city. Furthermore, it is undesirable to take control from the elected city officials and
give it to court appointees.
71. See 11 U.S.C. § 403(e) (1970). For a discussion of the "fair and equitable" standard
under Chapter IX, see p. 439 infra.
72. The existing statute and the proposed revisions confer standing on all creditors
to object to the plan, 11 U.S.C. § 403(b) (1970); H.R. 10624, § 93; S. 2597, § 816, but
require the judge to conduct these hearings. Indeed, the revisions narrowly limit the
reference of factual questions to a referee or special master. H.R. 10624, § 87(a); S. 2597,
§ 822(a). In the absence of institutional arrangements to accommodate the considerable
number of individual creditors seeking to be heard, the court could be inundated and
a readjustment of debts delayed.
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Such a reform also would mitigate the logistical problems of the
present statute and the proposed revisions. Instead of eight rounds of
notice as presently required 7 3 creditors would receive notice only
twice 74-at the beginning of the proceedings and after confirmation,
when the securities must be surrendered.7 Other time-consuming tasks,
such as classifying claims and hearing the views of creditors, still must
be performed, but are delegated to the panel of trustees to avoid
burdening the court and delaying the proceeding. Under these alterna-
tive procedures, the court still could reject a plan as inequitable. Yet
formulation and confirmation of a new plan would not necessitate a
new proceeding and a new vote,7 6 nor would the panel have to seek
creditor approval for every modification of the plan.
Another advantage of the proposal is that, unlike the existing
statute or the proposed revisions, which allow a vote only after the
plan has been drawn up, it guarantees creditors a right to participate
in the formulation of the plan. In addition, all creditor interests will
be represented throughout the proceedings. This representation pro-
vides more balanced creditor participation than a vote skewed toward
well-organized groups of creditors.
V. Problems Created by the Proposal
A. Constitutional Considerations
Legislation concerning municipal debt readjustment is within the
express power of Congress to "establish uniform Laws on the subject
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." 77 Placing the statute
73. The Judicial Conference's proposed Rule 9-14 for Chapter IX notes the steps in
the proceeding where notice is required under existing law. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, supra note 8.
74. Creditors desiring to appear before the panel would also receive notice of the
time and place of their hearing before the panel. Only the creditor representatives need
to receive notice of the confirmation hearing, since only they would appear.
75. Under the House and Senate revisions, creditors would also receive notice before
each vote and after each modification. H.R. 10624, §§ 90(b), 92(e); S. 2597, §§ 807, 815.
The House bill would require the creditor, upon receipt of initial notice, to request the
additional notice provided under existing Chapter IX. H.R. 10624, § 85(d). The Senate bill
would permit but not require the judge to adopt this procedure for notice upon request.
S. 2597, § 807(d).
76. Under the existing statute, 11 U.S.C. § 403(c) (1970), and the Senate bill, S. 2597,
§ 817(c), the proceedings must be dismissed if the judge rejects the plan as not meeting
the statutory standards. Under the House bill, a new plan may be proposed if the court
grants more time to do so. H.R. 10624, § 98(4).
77. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The "subject of bankruptcies" is "nothing less than
the subject of the relations between an insolvent or non-paying or fraudulent debtor, and
his creditors, extending to his and their relief." Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 672-73 (1935); United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S.
27, 47 (1938).
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within the power, however, does not remove it from the purview of
other constitutional provisions.78 In Ashton v. Cameron County Water
Improvement District No. One,7 9 the Supreme Court held that the
predecessor to Chapter IX interfered with state control of municipal
government in violation of the Tenth Amendment, but two years
later, after cosmetic changes by Congress, the Court in United States
v. Bekins upheld what is now Chapter IX.s0
While the Tenth Amendment no longer presents a serious con-
stitutional problem,"' Fifth Amendment objections to the proposal of
this Note may seem more substantial. The Bekins Court rejected a
Fifth Amendment challenge by relying on cases which upheld composi-
tions under other federal bankruptcy statutes.8 2 The proposal elim-
inates the creditor vote-the crucial element in the composition; the
question is whether this departure from the traditional model for
78. See Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445, 451 (1937); Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935).
79. 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
80. 304 U.S. 27 (1938). It is difficult to reconcile Bekins and Ashton. The Bekins Court
quoted the conclusion of the House Report that the new statute was constitutional be-
cause it permitted no interference with the "fiscal or governmental affairs" of political
subdivisions of the state. 304 U.S. at 51, quoting H. REP. No. 517, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
2-4 (1937). However, the first act expressly prohibited judicial interference with state or
municipal government. Compare Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 345, § 80(c)(11), (k), 48 Stat.
798, 801, 802, with 11 U.S.C. § 403(c), (i) (1970). Intending to reduce the impingement on
state and local sovereignty, Congress eliminated some minor provisions of the first act
(e.g., the application of the statute to counties, the requirement that a taxing district
open its books to creditors, and the authorization for rejection of executory contracts
by the city). It is hard to see constitutional significance in these changes.
One commentator has suggested that the revised statute was upheld because it provided
for a composition. Patterson, supra note 4, at 525, 528. Yet so did the first statute in
effect, if not in terms: a plan approved by the prescribed majority of creditors was im-
posed on the minority. See note 10 supra.
81. The Court has upheld federal laws under the commerce power even where they
intruded substantially on state interests. Northwestern Elec. Co. v. FPC, 321 U.S. 119
(1944); Troppy v. La Sara Farmers Gin Co., 113 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1940). In Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195 (1968) (Fair Labor Standards Act held applicable to state em-
ployees), the Court stated: "T]he Federal Government, when acting within a delegated
power, may override countervailing state interests whether these be described as 'gov-
ernmental' or 'proprietary' in character." (Emphasis added.) An exercise of the delegated
bankruptcy power should be as immune from Tenth Amendment attack as an exercise
of the commerce power.
82. The Court stated without elaboration, 304 U.S. at 54:
As the bankruptcy power may be exerted to give effect to a plan for the composition
of the debts of an insolvent debtor, we find no merit in appellant's objections under
the Fifth Amendment,
and cited In re Reiman, 20 F. Cas. 490 (No. 11,673) (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (upholding con-
stitutionality of Bankruptcy Act of 1869); Continental IL. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935) (upholding constitutionality of § 77, the
railroad reorganization statute). See Getz v. Edinburg Consol. Independent School Dist.,
101 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 308 U.S. 628 (1939) (Fifth Amendment
challenge to municipal bankruptcy act rejected on ground that composition was effected
by agreement of majority of creditors); see also Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 585-86 (1935).
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relief of the insolvent debtor undermines the constitutionality of the
statute.
The mere absence of a vote does not render the readjustment of
debts a taking of private property without just compensation or a
deprivation of property without due process of law. 8 3 The traditional
composition permits a plan to be imposed on a dissenting minority of
creditors; the cramdown power permits a plan to be imposed on a
dissenting majority, "so long as the creditor gets all the value of his
lien and his share of any free assets. ' - 4 The crucial requirement is that
the court find the plan fair and equitable. Where the court so finds,
eliminating the vote altogether seems no more objectionable than
overruling a negative vote.8 5
The proposal also should withstand any procedural due process
objections. Every creditor will receive the minimum procedural safe-
guards of notice and an opportunity to be heard before the panel of
trustees., In addition, every creditor will be represented before the
court at the confirmation hearing. s 7 Although the existing municipal
83. U.S. CONsr. amend. V provides:
[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
84. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495, 533 (1946) (foot-
note omitted) (upholding cramdown power under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 205(e) (1970)). For a discussion of the cramdown power under Chapter IX, see note
20 supra.
85. In the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974), upholding the
constitutionality of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-93 (Supp. IV
1974), the Supreme Court recently went further in allowing Congress to dispense with
creditor approval provisions in bankruptcy legislation. The Rail Act requires the re-
organization trustees of certain Northeast railroads to convey rail properties to a newly
created private corporation without a prior judicial determination that the plan for
compensating the creditors of the railroads is fair and equitable and without submission
of the plan to a vote by the creditors. See id. §§ 717, 719, 743. Citing Reconstruction Fin.
Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 328 U.S. 495 (1946), see note 84 supra, the Court rejected
constitutional challenges to the mandatory conveyance, on the ground that creditors
would be able to sue in the Court of Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(1970). for any amount by which their compensation fell short of the constitutional mini-
mum. 419 U.S. at 148-56. See Note, Conrail and Liquidation Value: Creditors' and Stock-
holders' Entitlement in the Regional Rail Reorganization, 85 YALE L.J. 371, 377-80 & n.21
(1976). Of course, no Tacker Act remedy would be necessary under the municipal bank-
ruptcy procedures proposed here, because the court would not confirm a plan it did not
find fair and equitable.
86. "The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be
heard." Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542
(1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
87. The limited right of intervention in class actions in the federal courts suggests
that adequate representation in itself satisfies the requirements of due process. If federal
bankruptcy remedies were not available, creditors could bring a class action against a
debtor under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). See 3B MOORE, supra note 68, f 23.35[2], at 23-604
(1975). Indeed, since a municipal bankruptcy proceeding requires the consent of the
municipal debtor, see 11 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970), there may still be a role for the creditor
class suit when the city is unwilling to enter bankruptcy. See 3B MOORE, supra f[ 23.09,
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bankruptcy and corporate and railroad reorganization statutes give
every creditor the right to vote on the plan and to be heard at the
confirmation hearing, the rights granted in equity receiverships, from
which these statutes evolved, were more limited. 8 The statutory pro-
cedures are not necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process of
law. The process which is due depends on a balancing of the govern-
ment's interest in expediting the proceeding and the individual's in-
terest in the outcomeS9 Giving every creditor a vote on the plan and a
right to be heard at the confirmation hearing could threaten the
financial viability of a large city-and perhaps even its ability to
govern itself 90-by impeding the readjustment of its debts. The govern-
ment's interest in a manageable readjustment of municipal debts out-
weighs the interest of the creditor in further participation in the
proceeding.91
at 23-2571 n.l, citing Women's Catholic Order of Foresters v. City of Ennis, 116 F.2d 270
(5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 589 (1941) (creditor who did not receive notice could
not challenge result of bondholders' class suit against city in default). In a (b)(1) class
action, the creditor would be bound by the outcome even though unable to opt out of
the class, see FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(c)(2); 3B MooRE, supra j 23.11[2], at 23-2826, and would
have no right to intervene in the proceeding if the party conducting the litigation could
adequately represent the creditor's interest. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Providing the creditor
with a remedy under the bankruptcy statutes does not increase the level of procedural
protection required by the Constitution. Nevertheless, the rights afforded under the
proposal are more substantial than those granted in federal class actions because every
creditor would receive notice and an opportunity to be heard at the first stage of the
proceedings.
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(13), (e) (1970) (railroad reorganization); id. § 403(b), (d)
(municipal bankruptcy); id. §§ 579, 606 (corporate reorganization).
In equity receivership, the procedures discouraged individual participation. S.E.C.
REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL, AND FUNC-
TIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITrEES (pt. VIII) 191 (1940). Stockholders
were held to be adequately represented by directors and officers of the corporation;
creditors, by the receiver; bondholders, by the indenture trustee. Only in the event of
fraud or collusion would the courts find such representation inadequate and permit in-
dividuals to intervene. 3B MOORE, supra note 68, f 24.11[l.-I].
89. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-66 (1970); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 1-34, 168-71 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring).
90. In the absence of a federal bankruptcy statute, a state court could issue mandamus
to compel the city in default to levy taxes to pay judgment creditors. See note 7 supra.
Default of a large city might also lead to the appointment of a federal or state trustee
to oversee the fiscal operations of the city. Cf. Act of June 10, 1975, ch. 168, 169, [1975]
Sess. Laws of N.Y. (McKinney) (establishing the Municipal Assistance Corporation).
91. In the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 156 (1974), the
Supreme Court rejected a procedural due process challenge to a mandatory conveyance
of rail properties in a federally subsidized reorganization even though the reorganization
court was to order conveyance before it reviewed the adequacy of the compensation paid
to creditors. See note 85 supra. The Court noted on the one hand that creditors were
assured fair compensation because they could sue in the Court of Claims for any short-
fall, and on the other hand that
the procedural sequence is vital to accomplishing the goals of the Act. If judicial
review of the terms of the transfer was required before the conveyance could occur,
the conveyance might well come too late to resolve the rail transportation crisis.
419 U.S. at 156.
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B. Ensuring a Fair Plan
Although constitutional, these alternative procedures for creditor
participation might be criticized on grounds of policy as less likely to
result in a fair plan than procedures which retain the creditor vote.
The plan negotiated by the panel of trustees with the city might be
more favorable to the city than a plan subject to creditor approval.
The lack of accountability to the creditors might increase the trustees'
temptation to collude with the city or at least decrease their incentive
to advance energetically the interests of the creditors. These dangers
would be lessened by judicial enforcement of the trustees' duty to
represent the interests of the creditors and by judicial review of the
record of the negotiations between the trustees and the city.9 2 Ul-
timately, the creditors' interests would be protected by strict applica-
tion of the statutory requirement that the plan be "fair, equitable,
and for the best interests of the creditors."' a Under Chapter IX, courts
have interpreted this standard to require that the plan provide the
creditors with all the revenues the city can raise by the exercise of its
taxing power without impairing government functions. 4 The fairness
of the plan to the creditors would be ensured by insisting that their
compensation reflect the maximum ability of the debtor to pay.
92. See note 69 supra.
93. 11 U.S.C. § 403(e) (1970). This phrase is a term of art, invoking the absolute
priority rule:
[E]ach class of creditors is to be awarded, in order of its priority, as much of the
going-concern value of the enterprise as is necessary to pay it off in full before the
next class may receive any participation, and no class may accept less than the
amount to which its priority entitles it if assets are distributed to a more junior class.
Brudney, The Bankruptcy Conmnission's Proposed "Modification" of the Absolute Priority
Rule, 48 Aar. BANKR. L.J. 305, 307-08 (1974). See Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute Priority
Doctrine in Corporate Reorganization, 41 U. CnH. L. REv. 651, 652 (1974).
The absolute priority rule applies in Chapter IX proceedings. 5 COLLIER, supra note 4,
81.19, at 1585-86 n.6, citing Kelley v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 319 U.S. 415 (1943).
See 10 H. REMINGrON, supra note 4, § 4317, at 554.
94. 10 H. REMINGTON, supra note 4, §§ 4317, 4322. To meet this requirement, the city
must raise taxes to the statutory or economic limit, the economic limit being the tax rate
at which the highest revenues can be obtained. In Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation
Dist., 114 F.2d 563, 565-66 (9th Cir. 1940), the court stated:
[W]e are unable to find . . . why it can be said that the plan is "equitable" and
"fair" and for the "best interests of creditors" with no sufficient showing that the
taxing power was inadequate to raise the taxes to pay them.
This same standard is imposed by the threshold requirement that the city be "insolvent
or unable to meet its debts as they mature." 11 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970). Thus, in Ouerbacker
v. Henderson County, 126 F.2d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 1942), a finding of insolvency was
upheld where an increase in taxes would have decreased revenues.
That the city must use the full measure of its taxing power does not mean that it
must allocate all its revenues to payment of its debt. It may retain sufficient funds to
provide essential governmental services. See Getz v. Edinburg Consol. Independent School
Dist., 101 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 308 U.S. 628 (1939) (where primary
purpose of the insolvent school district was to provide facilities for education, 50 percent
of its tax revenues was properly directed toward that end).
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One might argue that the creditor vote is important as a check not
only on the trustees' formulation of the plan but also on the court's
discretion in determining whether the plan is fair and equitable. But
the thesis advanced here has been that a vote dominated by large and
well-organized municipal creditors does not provide a guarantee or
even a reliable indication of the fairness of the plan.
It is thus essential that Congress eliminate the creditor approval
provisions and enact procedures for creditor participation which per-
mit a manageable readjustment of the debts of large cities. If it fails to
enact such reform, Congress will leave the municipal bankruptcy act
ineffectual where most needed.
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